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Mexico's energy regulator closes asset-less fuel trading: permits of up to two years that cannot buy from or sell to peers lacking transport or storage services

Translated from the Spanish original.

ContradictionInnovación & NegociosMedium term

On November 5, 2026, the CNE (Comisión Nacional de Energía, the national energy regulator) published in the DOF (the federal gazette) the general administrative provisions governing the trading of natural gas, refined products, LP gas and petrochemicals. Article 19 sets trading permits at a term "of up to two years"; Article 6 establishes that no effective offering activity exists when the permit holder fails to evidence it "during a continuous period of one hundred eighty calendar days"; Article 35 prohibits those who obtain a permit under these provisions from acquiring products from other traders that do not include "the provision, management or contracting of Transport, Storage or Distribution services", and Article 36 prohibits them from selling to those that do not incorporate "some value-added service related to the regulated activities", both without prejudice to the exceptions the regulation may provide. Article 34 requires weekly volumetric-control reports. Prior permits keep their validity (third transitory article) and their holders have 180 calendar days to evidence capacity and transport, storage or distribution arrangements (eighth transitory article). The figure of the asset-less trader was created by the 2014 energy reform and remains in the statute.

Strategic interpretation

Systemic: The 2014 market design —any third party may intermediate molecules with a permit— remains in the statute, and secondary regulation hollows it out: whoever obtains or renews a permit under the new regime cannot buy from asset-less peers or sell to them —save for the exceptions the regulation may set—, reports weekly, and its permit lasts up to two years; with terms that short, the regime reaches existing holders at their first renewal. The regime's declared incentive is the fight against illegal fuel invoicing, where the paper trader was a vehicle; the structural effect is to hand intermediation back to whoever owns assets —pipelines, tanks, fleets— or has contracts with those who do. Integrated permit holders, Pemex and large importers win; the independent intermediary that provided liquidity and price options loses. Consequence: It lands on the asset-less trader, which within a two-year permit cycle must integrate, partner or exit; and second-order, on the midsize industrial user —the plant that bought gas or diesel from an independent trader to avoid depending on a single supplier—, which loses counterparties just as contracts are renegotiated. Over 3-10 years, fuel trading returns to a pre-2014 concentration without any legal reform having decided it: the market closes by administrative provision, permit by permit, renewal by renewal. Worldview: That asset-less intermediation adds no value — that value lives in infrastructure and not in the function of finding, aggregating and covering demand. What to watch: How many trading permits the CNE renews under these rules during 2027; whether existing permit holders seek constitutional relief (amparos) against Articles 35 and 36; and whether the same mold —short permit plus asset requirement— later appears in electricity.

Sourcehttps://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5803022&fecha=05/11/2026

Diario Oficial de la Federación (federal gazette), November 5, 2026: agreement of the Comisión Nacional de Energía issuing the general administrative provisions for trading activity. Opened and read in the main thread on November 9, 2026: Articles 6, 19, 34, 35 and 36 quoted verbatim; the third and eighth transitory articles (validity of prior permits and the 180-calendar-day term to evidence arrangements) were checked in the independent verification the same day. The number of active trading permits was not verified and is therefore not asserted.

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Published on November 9, 2026